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FOREWORD 
This document attempts to illustrate the application of cost- 
effectiveness analysis as a practical tool for the systems designer. 
In particular, a method for selecting which parameters should be 
monitored in order to assess  the operational status of a telemetry 
system is illustrated. 
A paper, "Cost-Effectiveness Analysis: An Appreciation, If by 
E. S. Quade of the Rand Corporation is presented as an appendix 
to this document. As the primary purpose of this document is to 
illustrate the use of cost-effectiveness analysis, it is recommended 
that this appendix be read prior to reading the main document. 
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DESIGN OF A STATUS MONITOR 
USING COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Figure 1 shows the general design technique used to design a status moni- 
tor* for a satellite ground station. This document will describe in detail how 
each step of the design technique was accomplished to produce the design of a 
status monitor for the telemetry portion of a ground station. 
The telemetry installation considered in this document was proposed for 
the new Network Test and Training Facility (NTTF) located at the Goddard 
Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland. 
diagram of this installation. 
Figure 2 is the basic functional 
2.  THE STATUS MONITOR DESIGN 
The primary function which must be performed when designing a status 
monitor is to make a decision as to which, of all the possible parameters that 
could be monitored, should be monitored. 
is to  determine which parameters are the most effective in assessing the status 
of the telemetry installation and are  the least costly to monitor. 
The basis for making this selection 
The effectiveness of assessing the status and the cost to do so a re ,  in gen- 
eral ,  opposing factors. The selection thus becomes one of determining the 
monitoring configuration which exhibits the best effectiveness to cost ratio 
(effectiveness/cost) . 
This section of the document will describe how each step of the design was  
accomplished in order to determine the optimum status monitor. 
2 . 1  Step 1 - Define the Objective of the Status Monitor 
This step is the most important step in the design process. Designing a 
system which meets the wrong objectives is like solving the wrong problem. 
The resulting design may be completely inadequate o r ,  as a minimum, a 
suboptimum design will result. 
which are too narrow in scope. 
The most frequent e r r o r  is selecting objectives 
*The t e r m  " s t a t u s  moni tor"  a s  u s e d  i n  t h i s  p a p e r  r e f e r s  t o  t h e  t e s t s  t o  be made i n  o r d e r  t o  
a s s e s s  t h e  o p e r a t i o n a l  a b i l i t y  of t h e  s t a t i o n  and t h e  hardware  u s e d  t o  implement t h e  t e s t s .  
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(1) Define the objectives of the Status Monitor. 
1 
1 
(2) Describe the operational requirements of  the ground station. 
(3) Specify measurable quantities which most directly represent the 
operational requirements (these quantities w i l l  be called "per- 
formance indicators"). 
I 
1 
I 
(4) Develo methods of measuring the performance indicators and, 
as an a P ternate, parameters related to the performance 
indicators. 
 
-- 
I 
(5) Specify measures of effectiveness and cost to be used in rating 
the methods of measuring the performance indicators and their 
alternates. 
~~ ~~ ~ 
1 I 
(6) Screen the alternatives to determine the monitoring configuration 
with the greatest effectiveness/cost rating. 
Figure 1. A General Design Technique for a 
Satellite Ground Station Status Monitor 
2 
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The objective of monitoring the status of a ground station is to increase the 
ability of the station to meet its operational requirements. The next step in de- 
signing the status monitor is therefore to describe the operational requirements 
of the station. This step is described in Section 2 . 2 .  
The main operations which a status monitor may perform to meet the de- 
fined objective a re  as follows: 
(1) Failure* determination - This operation is to determine if the station 
is capable of operating within prescribed tolerances. This includes determining 
if all interfaces between sybsystems are properly configured and that the equip- 
ments are capable of performing their required function. 
be performed before corrective action can be taken. The corrective action may 
take the form of repairing the malfunction, replacing the faulty unit with a good 
one, o r  notifying operation-control that the station cannot meet the mission re- 
quirement, (then operation-control could take some corrective action like as- 
signing the function to a back-up station). No matter which action is taken the 
probability of meeting the mission requirements will be increased. 
This operation must 
(2) Failure isolation - In case of an indicated failure, information con- 
cerning the location of the faulty item is provided. This operation has the effect 
of decreasing the down-time required to correct the indicated failure, again in- 
creasing the probability of meeting the mission requirements. 
(3) Failure prediction - This is the operation of recognizing incipient 
failures in the system. This operation is accomplished by determining parame- 
ter drift and drift rates. This operation has  the effect of decreasing the number 
of failures thus also, increasing the probability of meeting the mission 
requirements. 
2.2 Step 2 - Describe the Operational Requirements of the Ground Station 
Operational requirements a r e  those functions which the ground station must 
perform t o  accomplish all its mission objectives. 
The complete operation of the NTTF is shown in Figure 3.  As illustrated, 
the station operation has been separated into five functions (tracking, telemetry, 
command, timing, and monitoring and maintenance). Figure 3 has also been 
divided into the various modes in which the station operates. 
(availability, prepass readiness, spacecraft (S/C) acquisition, telemetry (T/M) 
These modes 
'Fai lure  i s  def ined here  t o  mean any m a l f u n c t i o n  which p r e v e n t s  t h e  system from meet ing  
i t s  t o t a l  miss ion requirements .  
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assessment, etc.) ,  a r e  indicated at the very top of Figure 3. The operational 
requirements necessary for the station to perform each mode are indicated as 
rectangles on Figure 3.  
The information needed to construct Figure 3 was obtained by a review of 
the STADAN Orientation Manual, GSFC Operations Plans, and on-site 
procedures. 
This step, of describing on paper the operational requirements, is quite 
often left out of the intuitive design approach. When dealing with systems this 
step becomes necessary as it provides several important "bookkeeping" 
functions. 
By setting down operational requirements on paper there is less chance of 
omitting any requirements. This step also enables recognition of interfaces 
between the various operations (e. g. while the status monitor design being con- 
sidered is only for the telemetry portion of the station, Figure 3 indicates 
there exists interfaces which must be considered with the command and timing 
operations). Also indicated in Figure 3,  represented as circles,  is the input/ 
output functions of the station (e. g. station reporting requirements and source 
of operating requirements). 
The accomplishment of this step provides the basis for specifying perform- 
ance indicators, Step 3.  
2 . 3  Step 3 - Specify Measurable Quantities Which Most Directly Repre- 
sent the Operational Requirements (performance indicators) 
For  each operational requirement, represented as rectangles in Figure 3 ,  
measurable quantities which most directly represent the requirements a r e  de- 
rived. These measurable quantities are called "performance indicators. ' (  
Figure 4 illustrates the derivation of some performance indicators from 
the operational requirements. As illustrated, sometimes the requirements 
must be broken into sub-requirements before a measurable indicator of per- 
formance is derived. Thus there will be one or  more performance indicators 
for each operational requirement. 
The performance indicators are determined by reviewing the operational 
requirements (from Figure 3) and the hardware used in the system to accom- 
plish the operational requirements (from equipment manuals). 
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With the accomplishment of this step the designer has specified the mea- 
surable quantities which indicate that the station is able to meet its operational 
requirements. 
The next step in this design process is to develop methods of measuring 
the performance indicators or  measuring other parameters which are related 
to the performance indicators. 
2 .4  Step 4 - Develop Methods of Measuring the Performance Indicators 
and, As An Alternate, Parameters Related to the Perform- 
ance Indicators 
Performance indicators can be measured directly or a measurement of 
some other quantity which relates to the performance indicators can be made. 
Some measurement configuration may be quite effective in its ability to deter- 
mine the status of the performance indicators. Alternatively, other configura- 
tions may not be as effective but may be considerably cheaper to implement. 
The designer is thus faced with the age-old tradeoff problem of determining how 
much performance should he buy. 
This step requires "good hard-headed engineering" and a detailed analysis 
of the equipment and operations. Here again the designer needs some way of 
keeping track of the individual detailed measurements while maintaining a com- 
plete overall picture of the alternate design configurations. The method of 
performing this bookkeeping is through the development of a measurement net- 
work diagram together with a table describing the measurement details. 
An example of a trivial measurement network is illustrated in Figure 5. 
On Figure 5 measurements 1 and 2 represent two performance indicators. Al- 
ternate to measurement l measurements 3 and 4 could be made. Measurements 
6 and 4 is another alternative to measurement 1. Also illustrated is a case 
where one measurement (9) is an alternative to measuring performance indica- 
to rs  1 and 2 .  
Corresponding to each measurement in the measurement network is an 
entry in a table which describes how and where the measurement is performed. 
The next step in solving the tradeoff problem is to specify appropriate 
measures of effectiveness and cost with which to make the evaluation. 
9 
Figure 5. Example of a Measurement Network 
2 . 5  Step 5 - Specify Measures of Effectiveness and Cost to be Used in 
Rating the Methods of Measuring the Performance Indicators 
and Their Alternates 
The selection of the appropriate measures of effectiveness and cost is 
largely a matter of intuition (otherwise known as good hard-headed engineering). 
Here again, by putting these factors down on paper one is made aware of the 
reasons why a particular configuration was selected over others. 
The measures of effectiveness (or effectiveness factors) for a status moni- 
tor are: 
(a) How well the parameters monitored reflect variation of the perform- 
ance indicators (these are called sensitivity factors). 
(b) How well the parameters monitored recognize those items which ex- 
hibit a relatively high failure rate (these a r e  called reliability factors). 
(c) Are the parameters which are  most important to the overall mission 
success monitored (these are  called dependency factors). 
(d) The amount of uncertainty about the status of the station that can be 
resolved in the least amount of testing time (these are called time 
factors). 
The measures of costs (or cost factors) for a status monitor are:  
(a) Cost of equipment procurement; 
10 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
If some measures of effectiveness (or cost) a r e  more important than others, 
Cost of implementing the status monitor system; 
Cost of operating and maintaining the status monitoring system; 
Cost of data gathering and display of the status information. 
relative weightings can be assigned to the different effectiveness (cost) factors 
to reflect this in the tradeoff analysis. 
The methods for  arriving at the various effectiveness factor ratings a r e  as 
Sensitivity factors - The theoretical relation between the measured 
parameter and the related performance indicator is used to estimate 
the sensitivity rating. This theoretical relationship may exist in the 
form of an equation, graph, table or  it may need to be arrived at 
empirically. 
Reliability factors - Reliability ratings can be obtained from failure 
data, o r  if non-existent, from a reliability analysis using a parts 
count o r  a monte-carlo simulation, etc. 
Dependency factors - Dependency ratings are obtained from an analysis 
of the station configuration and the operational requirements. 
Time factors - Ratings of time factors a re  the result of test set-up 
time, testing time, and status interpretation time. Methods for esti- 
mating these time factors may require performing some empirical 
tests and possibly making a monte-carlo simulation. 
The methods for arriving at the cost factor ratings are as follows:* 
(a) Cost of equipment procurement - This rating is obtained from a sur- 
vey of instrumentation costs and is the sum of the costs of the different 
test functions** used. 
(b) Cost of implementation - A reasonable estimate of relative implemen- 
tation cost appears to be simply the sum of the number of different 
test functions used. 
*The reasoning behind these methods for arriving at cost factor ratings are presented in 
"A Study of Station Performance Criteria", by Operations Reasearch, Inc.. under Contract 
NAS5-9910 for NASA-mddard Space Flight Center. 
**A test function is one particular measurement. -
11 
(c) Cost of operation and maintenance - The relative cost of operation can 
be estimated from the total number of test functions. 
cost of maintenance is estimated by the number of different test 
functions. 
The relative 
(d) Cost of data gathering and display - A relative rating for this cost fac- 
tor  can be estimated from the total number of test functions. 
For each measurement path in the network the effectiveness and cost rating 
of the measurement must be determined. 
each measurement path. This rating is the sum of the ratings of the individual 
weighted effectiveness factors. There are two cost ratings for each measure- 
ment path. One cost rating is the sum of the ratings of the individual cost fac- 
tors  and is called the independent cost rating. 
into account the possibility of using the same instrumentation to make several 
measurements. This dependent cost factor is equal to the sum of all the cost 
factors less the cost of procurement of duplicate equipment. 
There is one effectiveness rating for  
The second cost rating takes 
2 .6  Step 6 - Screen the Alternatives to Determine the Monitoring Con- 
figuration With the Great e s t Effect ivene s s /C ost Rating 
In this step the measurement network is analyzed to determine the set of 
measurements which exhibits the highest effectiveness /cost ratio. 
If the measurement network is small, the selection could be made manually 
using such methods as matrix analysis or graph theory. If the measurement 
network becomes large the selection must utilize computer analysis. 
The measurement network is a direct analog to the PERT (Program Evalu- 
ation and Review Technique) network. Thus, a standard PERT critical path 
program can be used. Part I of the PERT computer program calculates the 
"best" path as a free running program (that is without constraints on effective- 
ness or  cost). 
tiveness o r  maximum cost, o r  both, the PERT-Part I1 (PERT with constraints) 
program is used. 
If it is desired to place constraints on either minimum effec- 
In this program the computer goes through all possible paths, keeping 
track of both dependent and independent cost factors, and prints out the path 
which exhibits the highest effectiveness/cost ratio. This path makes up the 
best of the alternate sets of tests for  monitoring the status of the telemetry por- 
tion of the NTTF. 
12 
Appendix A is a description of the optimum set of tests, as determined by 
the cost-effectiveness analysis, for monitoring the status of the telemetry por- 
tion of the NTTF. This description is presented to give the reader who is 
familiar with the station operation an indication of how completely the tests 
monitor the status of the telemetry installation. 
3. CONCLUSION 
This design procedure provides all the advantages of an intuitive design 
since the steps taken in this cost-effectiveness design includes exactly the same 
steps taken in an intuitive design. However, by performing this more rigorous 
design procedure the following significant advantages are achieved: 
(a) By putting down on paper the effectiveness and cost factors, the rea- 
sons for selecting a particular system design is made in terms mean- 
ingful to everyone; 
(b) By setting down on paper the station operational requirements and the 
performance indicators the determination of what should be displayed 
to the operator can be easily and rationally made. 
(c) By being forced to specify both the overall picture and the fine details, 
the designer can very easily determine how changes in the station con- 
figuration (or operation) affect the status monitor design. This fact 
will enable the status monitor to be efficiently modified to accommo- 
date the station changes; 
(d) By requiring that factors of sensitivity, reliability, time and cost be 
determined, the designer is made aware of any lack of available data 
needed to determine the various ratings. The designer then knows 
what experiments need to be made before a status monitor design can 
be confidently selected or  what data should be reported and in what 
format, to easily provide for future generation status monitoring 
systems. 
13 
PRECEDING PAGE BLANK NOT FILMED, 
I .  
APPENDIX A 
DESCRIPTION OF THE SELECTED 
STATUS MONITOR TESTS 
15 
I .  
STATUS MONITORING TESTS 
Test Group A: Frequency Modulation (FM) Mission Tests. 
1. Improvement Threshold Test. 
This test is to determine the improvement threshold point as given by 
KTB + N F  + lOdb (where KTB is the received noise power and N F  is the noise 
figure inherent to the system). The improvement threshold is defined as the 
point on the Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR)/Carrier-to-Noise Ratio (CNR) curve 
where the output SNR increases db-for-db with the input CNR. This test per- 
mits the determination of any degradations in the bandwidth (B) or the noise 
figure (NF) of the basic telemetry receiving system. 
2.  Combiner Performance Test. 
This test is to determine whether the CNR contributed by each re- 
ceived channel, at the improvement threshold point, is equal and that the two 
receiver outputs are being combined properly. 
3. Non-Linear Noise Measurement Test. 
This test is to determine, at the combiner output, the total phase non- 
Linearities that may occur within the receiving system. 
4. Automatic Frequency Control (AFC) Loop Dynamic Response Test. 
The combiner output is monitored to determine that the AFC loop dyna- 
mic response is capable of handling the doppler shifted transmission from any 
spacecraft. 
Test Group B: Phase Modulation (PM) Mission Tests. 
1. Acquisition Threshold Test. 
This test will show system sensitivity and variations in the phase-lock 
loop bandwidth by determining the carrier power required to achieve lock and 
to maintain lock. 
17 
2.  Combiner Performance Test. 
(a) This test will be to determine the improvement, over single re- 
ceiver operation, provided by the combiner over the range of lock threshold to 
saturation , and 
(b) To determine that the combiner switches properly at low CNR's. 
3. Doppler Extracting Test. 
This test will be to determine the ability of the Electrac Phase-locked 
Demodulator to extract and record the doppler phase shift. 
4. Non-Linear Noise Measurement Test. 
This test will be to determine, at the combiner output, the total phase 
non-linearities that may occur within the receiving system. 
Test Group C: Baseband Equipment Validation Tests. 
1. Pulse Code Modulation (PCM) Validation Tests. 
A test at the output of the (PCM/DHE) to determine the PCM e r ro r  
rate vs  CNR, at a given confidence limit, through the complete receiving sys- 
tem, tape recorders, and PCM/DHE. This test  is applicable to all Time Di- 
vision Multiplex signals. 
2 .  Pulse Frequency Modulation (PFM) Validation Test. 
A check at the chart recorder output to determine the saturation, 
noise and non-linearities of the PFM system performance. (The PFM system 
includes telemetry receiver , combiner , subcarrier multiplexer/demultiplexer , 
and chart recorders.) This test is applicable to all Frequency Division Multi- 
plex signals. 
3. Antenna and Servo Performance Test. 
To determine the correct electrical and mechanical operation of the 
antenna and servo tracking loop. (The antenna, tracking receiver and servo 
equipment are  checked. ) 
18 
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* 
This paper a t tempts  t o  c l a r i f y  t h e  na ture  and 
scope of cos t -e f fec t ivenesa  a n a l y s i s  and t o  p o i n t  
ou t  i ts  proper r o l e  a s  an a i d  t o  decisionmaking. 
It  d iscusaes ,  i n  the  contex t  of na t iona l  s e c u r i t y  
problems, the r e l i a b i l i t y  and l i m i t a t i o n s  of such 
analyses and ways t o  improve i t a  q u a l i t y .  
In t roduct ion  
Cos t -e f fec t iveness  is not a catchword t o  SUE- 
g e s t  we a r e  doing something new, f o r  t h e  need t o  
consider cos t  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  must 
have occurred t o  the e a r l i e s t  planners.  What i n  
novel,  however, is t h e  marvelous refinement of 
methods f o r  r e l a t i n g  c o s t  t o  performance t h a t  has 
taken p l a c e  in  the  l a s t  few years and t h e  accep- 
tance of these  methods a t  high p o l i c y  l e v e l s  where 
they  a r e  o f t e n  proposed a s  a panacea f o r  a l l  the  
i l l s  of i n t r i c a t e  decisionmaking. 
w i t i o n s  
What i s  a cos t -e f fec t iveness  a n a l y s i s ?  
Broadly defined ( too  broadly f o r  my t a s t e )  i t  is 
any a n a l y t i c  s tudy  designed t o  a s s i s t  a dec is ion-  
maker i d e n t i f y  a p r e f e r r e d  choice from among pos- 
s i b l e  a l t e r n a t i v e s .  I n  a m i l i t a r y  c o n t e x t ,  typ i -  
c a l  analyses might t a c k l e  such ques t ions  a s  t h e  
ex tcn t  t o  which a i r c r a f t  should be repa i red  a t  a 
depot r a t h e r  than on t h e  base; the  p o s s i b l e  char- 
a c t e r i s t i c s  of a new s t r a t e g i c  bomber and whether 
one should be developed o r  n o t ;  whether t a c t i c a l  
a i r  wings o r  c a r r i e r  t a s k  forces  should be sub- 
s r i t u t e d  f o r  U.S. ground d i v i s i o n s  i n  Europe; o r  
whether we should modify the t e s t  ban t r e a t y  now 
t h a t  the Chinese C m u n i s t s  have nuc lear  weapons 
and ,  if so ,  how. One s t a g e  of  each such a n a l y s i s  
involves a Comparison of a ! te rna t ive  courses  of 
a c t i o n  in t e r n s  of  t h e i r  c o s t s  and t h e i r  e f fec-  
t iveness  i n  a t t a i n i n g  some s p c c i f i c  ob jec t ive .  
This i s  cos t -e f fec t iveness  a n a l y s i s ,  narrowly 
defined. Usually t h i s  comparison takes  t h e  form 
of a n  attempt to  minimize the cos t  impl ica t ions  
subjec t  to  some mission requirement (which i n  
broad problems i s  not Likely t o  bc measurable i n  
d o l l a r  terns) o r ,  converse ly ,  t o  maximize some 
physical measure o f  performance s u b j e c t  t o  a 
budget c o n s t r a i n t .  
share  of a t t e n t i o n  by t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s ,  tlie c n t i r c  
s tudy  i s  o f t e n  c a l l e d  a c o s t - c f f e c t i v e n c s s  analy- 
sis. But t h i s  namc emphasizes j u s t  onc aspec t  of  
Since such comparisons rece ivc  t h e  l i o n ' s  
* 
Any vicws cxprcssed in  t h i s  papcr a r e  tliose 
nf tlie author.  They shmzld n0t hc i n t c r p r e t r d  a s  
re f  lec t ing  t l ir  vicws uf Tlic RAND Corporetion n r  
thc  o f f i c i a l  opinion or pa,licy ( 1 1  any of i t s  Kov- 
rrnrncmtal i,r p i  i v a t c  r c s e a r c l ~  s p 9 n h c ) i - s .  Papers 
a r c  rcprodurrd b y  Tlw U A N D  C O I \ ~ ~ I P . ~ I O I I  a s  a
c,wrtt,sv I O  n ~ t ~ l ~ ~ . r s  , ) r  i t s  : . t a r t .  
t h e  study. For advice on broad ques t ions  of  po l icy  
such  a s  those  r e l a t e d  t o  n a t i o n a l  defense  (where 
c o s t - e f f e c t i v e n e s s  has been most ex tens ive ly  used). 
f a c e t s  of  t h e  problem o t h e r  than the comparison of  
a l t e r n a t i v e s  m y  be of g r e a t  s ign i f icance .  Among 
t h e s e  a r e :  the a p e c i f i c a t i o n  of s e n s i b l e  objec- 
t i v e s ,  the  determination of a s a t i s f a c t o r y  way t o  
measure perfonnance, t h e  inf luence  of  considcr- 
a t i o n s  t h a t  c a n ' t  be q u a n t i f i e d ,  or t h e  discovery 
of b e t t e r  a l t e r n a t i v e s .  
a homely example. 
v i s i o n  set. Not only i s  t h e i r  o b j e c t i v e  f a i r l y  
c l e a r ,  b u t ,  i f  they have pa id  due a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  
adver t i sements ,  t h e i r  a l t e r n a t i v e s  a r e  w e l l -  
defined. The s i t u a t i o n  is then one f o r  c o s t - c l f e c -  
t i v e n e s s  a n a l y s i s .  The only  s i g n i f i c a n t  ques t ions  
t h e  family need answer concern t h c  d i f f e r c n c c s  
among the  a v a i l a b l e  s e t s  i n  performance and cos t .  
With a l i t t l e  c a r e ,  making propcr allowancc f o r  
f i n a n c i n g ,  d e p r e c i a t i o n ,  and maintenance, they can 
e s t i m a t e ,  say ,  the  f i v e  year  procurement and 
o p e r a t i n g  c o s t  of any p a r t i c u l a r  s e t  and do so 
with  a f e e l i n g  t h a t  they a r e  wel l  i n s i d c  t h e  b a l l  
park.  They w i l l  d i s c o v e r ,  of course ,  t h a t  f i n d i n g  
a s tandard  f o r  measuring t h e  performancc of t h e  
var ious  s e t s  is somewhat more d i f f i c u l t .  For onc 
t h i n g ,  i t  may have many aspec ts - -co lor  q u a l i t y ,  
t h e  opt ion  f o r  remote c o n t r o l ,  p o r t a b i l i t y ,  s c r e w  
s i z e ,  and so f o r t h .  But,  o r d i n a r i l y ,  one cons idcr -  
ation--perhaps color--determines a p r i c e  c l a s s .  
On t h i s  b a s i s ,  one can look a t  r o l o r  s e t s ,  compare 
c o a t s  a g a i n s t  c o l o r  q u a l i t y ,  and detcrmine a b e s t  
buy. 
N w  suppose the  family f i n d s  they havc more 
money t o  spend and thus decide t o  increase  t h e i r  
s tandard  of l iving--a d e c i s i o n  s i m i l a r  t o  one t o  
s t r e n g t h e n  t h e  U.S. defense  pos ture  by incrcas ing  
t h e  m i l i t a r y  budget. This i s  a s i t u a t i o n  c a l l i n g  
f o r  a broader a n a l y s i s .  Thcy f i r s t  need t o  
i n v e s t i g a t e  t h e i r  goa ls  o r  o b j c c f i v e s  and look 
i n t o  t h e  f u l l  range of a l t e r n a t i v e s - - a  new c a r ,  
a p i a n o ,  a t r i p  t o  Europe. Tlicy thcn must f i n d  
ways t o  measure how w e l l  t l iese a l t e r n a t i v e s  
accomplish t l i c i r  goa ls  and c s t a b l i s h  c r i t c r i a  Cor 
choice  among tlicm. Because t h e  a l t c r n a t  ivcs a r c  
so d i s s i m i l a r .  d r t r r m i n i n g  what t h r y  want t o  i s  
t h e  major problem; how t o  do i t  and I iow 10 dl. tcr-  
mine what i t  c o s t s  i s  a comparativclv niiiit>r SWL,. 
a s tudy  m u s t  look a t  the  c n t i r r  prc>blmn and ltltlk 
a t  i t  i n  i t s  propcr contex t .  Cl ia rac t , . r i s t i ra l lv ,  
such a n  a n a l y s i s  w i l l  i twolvc a s y a l \ w i a l i <  ~ n v e n -  
t i g a t i o n  of tlic drcisiolunakcr 's  o l r j c . c . 1  ivcr  ~ I I J  
t h e  rc l rvnnt  c r i t r r i a ;  a c , , , , , p a r i ~ ~ ~ , i - - ~ , , . i , , t  i t i i t  IV., 
wIici-c* poss ib l r - -or  tlic cbrsts. c f l t . c l  i v ~ w ~ ' . ? ,  r t * h , . .  
and timinx assc,ciat,.cl ~ ~ 1 1 1  th,, . ~ l l t ~ i n a t t v ~ ~  J)I~I I \  1,s 
o r  s t r a t c g i r s  fc>r a ~ . l t ~ c , v i n ~  ~ s . i t . 1 1  . ~ I , ~ L . L ~ I V ~ . ,  . I I ~  t 1
attcmpt t o  f n n l ~ t ~ l n t , ,  l > , . t i , . ~  : t I t L ' i n a t  I\', . I !  I I I . . . .  
cxnm~n,.J Q I - c  C<w1,J v . i i i t  io) ' .  f \ l t l ~ ~ w t ~ , l ~  I / , I . l l ' i  l ' ,  
Let m e  t r y  t o  i l l u s t r a t e  t h i s  l a s t  po in t  with 
Suppose a family has decided t o  buy a t e l e -  
I n  b r i c f ,  t o  Iiandlc a broad Iir{'bIviii a d c p u l c l y  
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name "systems a n a l y s i s "  f o r  t h e  b roade r  a n a l y s i s ,  
i n  what f o l l o w s  I ' l l  u s e  t h e  term c o s t - e f f e c t i v e -  
nes s  f o r  t h e  f u l l  r a n g e ,  broad and narrow,  o f  
a n a l y t i c  approaches  t o  a i d  a dec i s ionmaker  w i t h  
problems o f  cho ice .  
The Essence o f  t h e  Method 
What is t h e r e  abou t  a n  a n a l y t i c  approach  t h a t  
makes i t  b e t t e r  o r  more u s e f u l  t h a n  o t h e r  ways t o  
f u r n i s h  a d v i c c - - t h a n ,  s a y ,  an e x p e r t  o r  a commit- 
tee? I n  a r e a s  such as d e f e n s e  p l a n n i n g ,  where 
t h e r e  IS no a c c e p t e d  t h e o r e t t c a l  f o u n d a t i o n ,  
a d v i c e  ob ta ined  from e x p e r t s  working i n d i v i d u a l l y  
or a s  a c o m n i t t e e  depends l a r g e l y  on judgment and 
ombined s y s t e m a t i -  
c a l l y  and e f f i c i e n t l y  t o  y i e l d  r e s u l t s  t h a t  c a n  
t r anscend  t h o s e  of any i n d i v i d u a l  o r  comni t t ee .  
The e s sence  o f  t h e  method is t o  c o n s t r u c t  and 
o p e r a t e  w i t h i n  a 'hodel"--a  s i m p l i f i e d ,  s t y l i z e d  
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  r e a l  world which a b s t r a c t s  
tile c a u s e  and e f f e c t  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  e s s e n t i a l  t o  
t h e  q u e s t i o n  b e i n g  s t u d i e d .  Such a model--which 
may t a k e  such  v a r i e d  forms as a set  of  mathemati-  
c a l  e q u a t i o n s  o r  a computer  program, a war game, 
o r  cvcn a p u r e l y  v e r b a l  s c e n a r i o - - i n t r o d u c e s  a 
y r c c i s e  s t r u c t u r e  and terminology t h a t  s e r v e  
p r i m a r i l y  a s  a means o f  comnun ica t ion ,  e n a b l i n g  
t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  t h e  s tudy  t o  make t h e i r  
judgments i n  a c o n c r e t e  c o n t e x t  and w i t h  p r o p e r  
r c f e r c n c e  t o  t h e  judgment o f  o t h e r s .  Moreover ,  
t h rough  f ecdback- - the  r e s u l t s  o f  computa t ion ,  t h e  
countcrmoves i n  t h e  war game, o r  t h e  c r i t i q u e  of 
t!ic s c e n a r i o - - t h e  model h e l p s  t h e  e x p e r t s  t o  
r e v i s e  t h e i r  e a r l i e r  judgments and t h u s  t o  a r r i v e  
a t  a c l c a r c r  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  of t h e  problem and i t s  
con t c x  t . 
The c e n t r a l  importance o f  t h e  model ( o r  t h e  
inodeLs, f o r  i t  may be i n q p r o p r i a t e  o r  a b s u r d  t o  
a t t a n p t  t o  i n c o r p o r a t e  a l l  a s p e c t s  o f  a problem i n  
a sLnglc f o r m u l a t i o n )  c a n  be seen  most r e a d i l y ,  
p ' r h a p s ,  by look ing  a t  i t s  r o l e  i n  t h e  c h o i c e  o f  
2 ! t c r n a  t i v c s  . 
Having fo rmula t ed  and r e sea rched  t h e  problem 
- - t l l a t  i s ,  c l a r i f i e d  t h e  i s s u e s ,  l i m i t e d  t h e  
c r t v n t  o f  t h c  i n q u i r y ,  s ea rched  ou t  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  
< i o t a  and r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  d i s c o v e r e d  what o b j e c t i v e s  
t;ie dec i s ionmaker  is, or  shou ld  b e ,  t r y i n g  t o  
a t t a i n ,  and how t o  mcasure t h e  c x t e n t  t o  which 
t l icv a r e ,  i n  f a c t ,  a t t a i n e d ,  and b u i l t  v a r i o u s  
mcrd~.Is--thc p r o c e s s  i s  somewhat a s  fo l lows .  (See 
( I t a r t . )  To b e g i n ,  t h e  v a r i o u s  a l t e r n a t i v e s  o r  
iniea~is hy which one can  hope t o  a t t a i n  t h e  o b j e c -  
t i v e s  (which may liavc t o  be d i s c o v e r l d  o r  i nven ted  
as  p a r t  o l  tlie a n a l y s i s )  a r e  examined by means o f  
LIic M. These  models  t e l l  u s  what wc  can  
c x p c c t  f r m  each p a r t i c u l a r  a l t e r n a t i v e  w i t h  
r e s p e c t  t o  such t h i n g s  a s  a t t r i t i o n ,  r e l i a b i l i t y ,  
and so  f o r t h .  and what t h e  a r e .  The 
measure of e f f e c t i v e n e s s  then  t e l l s  u s  t h c  c x t c n t  
t o  wliicti cach o b j e c t i v e  i s  a t t a i n e d .  A c r i t e r i o n  
o r  nile o f  c h o i c e  c a n  t h e n  be used t o  weigh t h e  
c n s t s  a g a i n s t  pcrformancc and t h u s  a r r a n g e  the  
a l t e r n a t i v e s  i n  o r d c r  <)f prc . f , , r t ,ncr .  
T h i s  p r o c e s s  may be  d i f f i r u l t  t o  c a r r y  o u t .  
For i n s t a n c e ,  c o n s i d e r  t h e  e s t i m a t i o n  o f  t o t a l  
system r e l i a b i l i t y .  Of t en  t h i s  is r e p r e s e n t e d  by 
the  mean t i m e  between f a i l u r e s  (MTBF), c a l c u l a t e d  
by t a k i n g  t h e  r e c i p r o c a l  o f  t h e  sum of  t h e  r e c i p -  
r o c a l s  o f  t h e  subsystem MTBF's. The e x p o n e n t i a l  
b f s t r i b u t i o n  i s  then  used t o  o b t a i n  t h e  p r o b a b i l -  
i t y  t h a t  no system f a i l u r e  w i l l  o c c u r  i n  a t i m e  
pe r iod .  T h i s  s imple  scheme i n v o l v e s  at  least t o u r  
t a c i t  a s sumpt ions :  
o The time between f a i l u r e s  i s  exponen- 
o F a i l u r e s  o f  subsys t ems  a r e  independen t ,  
o A subsystem f a i l u r e  imp l i e s  a system 
o Subsystems a r e  u t i l i z e d  e q u a l l y  i n  t ime 
t i a l  l y  d i s t r i b u t e d  , 
f a i l u r e ,  
I d e a l l y ,  t h e  e q u a t i o n s  which e x p r e s s  r e l i a b i l i t y  
shou ld  accoun t  f o r  subsystem f a i l u r e  r a t e s ,  
r cdundanc ie s ,  dependenc ie s ,  and u t i l i z a t i o n .  
While c o m p l i c a t e d ,  t h i s  i s  n o t  beyond t h e  capa-  
b i l i t i e s  of a computer. But t h e  e s t i m a t e s  of t h e  
subsystem f a i l u r e  r a t e s  t hemse lves  depend on 
p a r t i a l  measurements and i n t u i t i v e  judgments o f  
t h e  i n f l u e n c e  of  t e m p e r a t u r e ,  h u m i d i t y ,  d u s t ,  
s h o c k ,  s t ress ,  v i b r a t i o n ,  o p e r a t i n g  c y c l e ,  and t h e  
environment .  The end r e s u l t  may be t h a t  p r e d i c -  
t i o n s  from t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  model a r e  h i g h l y  u n c e r -  
t a i n .  
a l t e r n a t i v e s  a r e  no t  adequa te  t o  a t t a i n  t h e  o b j e c -  
t i v e s ;  measurcs  o f  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  do no t  r e a l l y  
measure t h e  e x t e n t  t o  which t h e  o b j e c t i v e s  a r e  
a t t a i n e d ;  t h e  p r e d i c t i o n s  from o t h e r  mode l s ,  as 
w e l l  a s  from t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  modc l ,  a r e  f u l l  o f  
u n c e r t a i n t i e s ;  and o t h e r  c r i t e r i a  which look 
a lmos t  as a t t r a c t i v e  a s  t h e  one chosen may lead 
t o  a d i f f e r e n t  o r d c r  of  p r e f e r e n c e .  When t h i s  
happens ,  no one is happy and WE must t a k e  a n o t h e r  
approach .  D i s sen t  and d i s c u s s i o n  f e r c e  mod i f i ca -  
t i o n  of o r i g i n a l  i d e a s  abou t  o b j e c t i v e s  and a l t e r -  
n a t i v e s  a r e  r edcs igned .  The key t o  s u c c e s s f u l  
a n a l y s i s  i s  a con t inuous  c y c l e  o f  Connu la t in2  t h e  
problem, s e l e c t i n g  t h e  o b j e c t i v e s ,  d e s i g n i n g  
b e t t e r  a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  c o l l e c t i n g  d a t a ,  b u i l d i n g  new 
mode l s ,  weighing c o s t  a g a i n s t  pe r fo rmance ,  ques -  
t i o n i n g  a s sumpt ions  and d a t a ,  recxamining t h e  
o b j e c t i v e s ,  opening new a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  and so  on 
u n t i l  s a t i s f a c t i o n  is o b t a i n e d  o r  t ime o r  money 
f o r c e s  a c u t o f f .  
I n  f a c t ,  t h i n g s  a r e  seldom t i d y .  Too o f t e n  
The L i m i t a t i o n s  
Ana lys i s  of t h i s  t ype  i s  n o t  o n l y  d i f f i c u l t  
to  do well bu t  even  when w e l l  done t h e r e  a r e  many 
l i m i t a t i o n s .  Some o f  t h e s e  a r e  due t o  l i m i t a t i o n s  
i n h e r e n t  i n  a l l  a n a l y s i s  o f  cho ice .  O the r s  a r e  
due t o  t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  encoun te red  i n  copirr, w i t h  
such t h i n g s  a s  t h e  v a r y i n g  times a t  which a l t e r -  
n a t i v e s  become a v a i l a b l e  o r  u n c e r t a i n t y  abou t  t h e  
enemy. S t i l l  o t h e r s  are f l aws  o r  e r r o r s  wh ich ,  
h o p e f u l l y ,  w i l l  d i s a p p e a r  a s  we l e a r n  t o  do b e t t e r  
and more thorough a n a l y s e s .  The most dangerous 
s o u r c e  o f  d c f c c t s ,  however ,  is a n  a t t e n t i o n  b i a s .  
I t  is f r e q u e n t l y  caused  by t h e  c l i c r i shed  b e l i c f s  
o r  unconscious adlierencu t o  a ' p a r t y  l i n e "  t h a t  
a l l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  l < ~ . ; t c r  t o  some c x t e n t .  
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It is important t o  remember t h a t  a l l  a n a l y s i s  
of choice f a l l s  s h o r t  of s c i e n t i f i c  research. No 
mat te r  how we s t r i v e  t o  maintain s tandards  of 
s c i e n t i f i c  inqui ry  or how c l o s e l y  we attempt t o  
follow s c i e n t i f i c  methods, we cannot tu rn  c o s t -  
e f f e c t i v e n e s s  a n a l y s i s  i n t o  sc ience .  I ts  objec- 
t i v e ,  i n  c o n t r a s t  t o  t h a t  of s c i e n c e ,  is p r i m a r i l y  
t o  r e c m e n d - - o r  a t  l e a s t  t o  suggest--pOliCy, 
r a t h e r  than merely t o  understand and p r e d i c t .  
Like engineer ing ,  i t  seeks t o  use the r e s u l t s  of 
science t o  do th ings  well  and chcaply. Yet i t  
d i f f e r s  from ord inary  engineering in  i t s  enormous 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  i n  sometimes being forced  by the  
na ture  or urgency of  a problem t o  s u b s t i t u t e  
i n t u i t i o n  f o r  v c r i l i a b l e  knowlcdgc, in  the  unusual 
d i f f i c u l t y  of appra is ing- -or  even discovering--. 
v a l u e  system a p p l i c a b l e  t o  i t s  problems, and i n  
t h e  ahsence of ways t o  t e s t  i t s  v a l i d i t y .  
Exccpt f o r  t h i s  i n a b i l i t y  t o  v e r i f y ,  c o s t -  
e f f e c t i v e n e s s  a n a l y s i s  may s t i l l  look l i k e  a 
pure ly  r a t i o n a l  approach t o  decisionmaking, a 
c o l d l y  o b j e c t i v e ,  s c i e n t i f i c  method f r e e  of  pre- 
conceived ideas  and p a r t i s a n  b i a s  and judgment and 
i n t u i t i o n .  But i t  i s n ' t  r e a l l y .  Human judgment 
is used i n  designing t h e  a n a l y s i s :  i n  dec id ing  
what a l t e r n a t i v e s  t o  c o n s i d e r ,  what f a c t o r s  a r e  
r e l e v a n t ,  what the  i n t e r r c l a t i o n s  between t h e s e  
f a c t o r s  a r e ,  and what numerical va lues  t o  choose. 
Moreover, i t  is human Judgment which ana lyzes  and 
i n t e r p r e t s  the  r e s u l t s  of  the a n a l y s i s .  This f a c t  
- - t h a t  judgment and i n t u i t i o n  permeate a l l  analy- 
sis--should be remembered when we examine t h e  
r e s u l t s  t h a t  comc, wi th  apparent high p r e c i s i o n ,  
from analys is .  
a n a l y s i s ,  not e r r o r s ,  t h a t  confine it  t o  a n  
advisory r o l e .  I s h a l l  s i n g l e  out t h r e e  of them 
f o r  fur ther  comnent: a n a l y s i s  is n e c e s s a r i l y  
incomplete; measures of e f f e c t i v e n e s s  a r e  inevi -  
t a b l y  approximate; and ways t o  p r e d i c t  the  f u t u r e  
a r e  lacking. 
Analvsis is n e c e s s a r i l v  incomplete 
But i t  is  t h e  inherent  l i m i t a t i o n s  of t h e  
Time and money c o s t s  obviously p lace  sharp  
l i m i t s  on how f a r  any inqui ry  can be c a r r i e d .  
Othcr cos ts  a r e  important h e r e  too. For i n s t a n c e ,  
we would l i k e  to  f i n d  out  what the Chicoms would 
do i f  we p u t  an cnd t o  a l l  m i l i t a r y  a i d  t o  South- 
e a s t  Asia. One way t o  ge t  c h i s  information would 
be t o  s top  such a i d .  B u t  whi le  t h c  i m e d i a t e  
d o l l a r  cost  would be low, the  l ike l ihood of o t h e r  
c o s t s  occurring i n  time precludes a t  once t h i s  
type of i n v e s t i g a t i o n .  
f a c t  tha t  even wi th  no l i m i t a t i o n s  of time or 
money a n a l y s i s  can never t r c a t  a l l  the  conaider -  
a t i o n s  tha t  may be rc lcvant .  
For example, how some u n i l a t c r a l  U . S .  a c t i o n  w i l l  
a f f e c t  NATO s o l l d a r i t y  or whether Congress w i l l  
accept  m i l i t a r y  ccmomien t h a t  d i a r u p t  cherlahed 
i n a t i t u t i o n s  such as tlic National Guard or r a d i -  
c a l l y  cliangc tlic p a t t c r n  of domcutir m i l i t a r y  
apending a r e  ques t ions  t h a t  a r c  hard t o  Iiandlc 
objec t ive ly .  Conslderations of  t h i s  type c a n ,  and 
poaalbly ahould,  p lay  as important a role in t h e  
choice  of a l t e r n a t i v e  f o r c c  pos tures  as any i d e a l -  
i r e d  war outcome c a l c u l a t i o n s .  But ways t o  menun! 
S t i l l  more impor tan t ,  howcvcr, is the  genera l  
Some a r e  in tangib lc .  
t h e s e  th ings  e;.en approximately d o n ' t  e x i s t  today 
and they  must be handled i n t u i t i v e l y  Other i s sues  
involve moral Judgments: whether n a t i o n a l  security 
is b e t t e r  served by an i n c r e a s e  i n  the  budget f o r  
defense  or f o r  wel fa re  o r  under what circumstances 
t h e  preserva t ion  of an a l l y  i s  worth t h e  r i s k  of  
s e n e r a l  war. 
ment and i n t u i t i o n  and t h a t  of o t h e r s  t o  these  
cons idera t ions  ( a t  l e a s t  t o  those of which he is 
aware!), thus making them p a r t  o f  t h e  study and 
u n a  t h em to  the  a t t e n t i o n  of thc decislrm- 
w. 
r i g h t l y  i n s i s t  on applying h i s  own. 
Measures of e f f e c t i v e n e s s  a r c  approximate 
The a n a l y s t  can apply  h i s  own Judg- 
But thc  man with the  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  w i l l  
In  m i l i t a r y  c o s t - e f l e c t i v e n e s s  comparisons,  
measures of e f f e c t i v e n e s s  a r e  a t  b e s t  reasonably 
s a t i s f a c t o r y  approximations f o r  i n d i c a t i n g  the  
a t ta inment  of much vaguely def ined  o b j e c t i v e s  a s  
d e t e r r e n c e  or v i c t o r y .  Sometimes t h e  bes t  t h a t  
can be done is t o  f i n d  measures which poin t  i n  the  
r i g h t  d i r e c t i o n .  Consider d e t e r r e n c e ,  f o r  ins tance  
It e x i s t s  only i n  the  mind--and i n  the  enemy's 
mind a t  t h a t .  We cannot ,  t h e r e f o r c ,  measure 
d i r e c t l y  t h e  e f f c c t i v e n r s s  of a l t e r n a t i v e s  wc hope 
v i 1 1  lead t o  d e t e r r e n c e ,  bu t  mst u s e  ins tcad  
approximations such a s  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  m o r t a l i t i c s  
t h a t  we might i n f l i c t  o r  t h e  roof cover we might 
des t roy .  
two f o r c c  pos tures  ind ica ted  t h a t  one3could inf l ic t  
SO per  cent  more c a s u a l t i e s  on the  enemy than the  
o t h e r ,  we could not conclude t h a t  t h i s  pos ture  
s u p p l i e s  50 per  c e n t  more d e t e r r e n c e .  I n  I a c t ,  
s i n c e  i t  may be important no t  t o  louk tou danger- 
o u s ,  we f i n d  argumcnts tha t  the  p o s t u r e  which 
t h r e a t e n s  the  g r e a t e s t  number of c a s u a l i t i c s  may 
provide  t h e  l e a s t  deterrence! 
accuracy of our es t imates  of  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  a s  we 
are about our c o s t  e s t i m a t e s .  It  i s  the  opin ion  
of armlys ts  who a r e  s tudying  the  problem of c s t i -  
o u t i n g  p o t e n t i a l  c a s u a l t i e s  t h a t  t h e s e  cs t imates  
could  e a s i l y  be  o f f  by f a c t o r s  of t h r e e  o r  four.  
I n  b r i e f ,  we d o n ' t  know how t o  t r a n s l a t e  a 
c a p a b i l i t y  t o  c r e a t e  c a s u a l t i e s  (as  perceived by 
t h e  enemy) i n t o  d e t e r r e n c e ,  we don't  know how thcy 
w i l l  compute t h e  casua l ty-producing  c a p a b i l i t y  of 
our  f o r c e s ,  and wc d o n ' t  even know how t o  do i t  
ourse lves  very a c c u r a t e l y .  
Don't misunderstand me--the de tc rmina t ion  of 
even th? d o l l a r  c o s t s  of a m i l i t a r y  a c t i w  in not 
a implc ,  and t o  t r a c c  oiit a11 the  rcsourcc  impll- 
c a t i o n s  of forces  and weapons t h a t  a r c  a s  v c t  only  
conccpta l a  d i f f i c u l t .  But once we dcc idc  !&& wu 
a r e  c o a t i n g ,  we can  do I a i r l y  wel l .  
L m t l a f L E t o r v  way t o  f o r e c a s t  t lw  l u t u r c  c n i u t r  
While it is posa ib le  t o  f o r c c a a t  cvtsilts to  
cane  in t h c  aenac 01 mapping out  p n r s i b l c  i u t u r c a .  
t l i e rc  l a  no m t i a f a c t o r y  way t o  p r e d i c t  a r inplrl  
f u t u r e  i n  tcnns of which we can  work out  tlic hcut 
ayatun  or d c t c n i n c  an optirnsn pol icy .  
q u c n t l y ,  wc m a t  c o n s i d e r  a range of pons ih lc  
f u t u r c s  or cont ingcncics .  In any one oC tlib>sc w v  
may hc a b l c  to d c s i g n a t c  a p r c f c r r o d  EINII'SC of 
a c t i o n ,  bu t  we havc no way to  de tcnninc  kv1c far 
Consequently,  even i f  a comparison of 
Moreover, we c a n ' t  be a s  conf ident  about the  
CUIWC- 
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the  e n t i r e  range of p o s s i b i l i t i e s .  
a f o r c e  s t r u c t u r e  f o r  a p a r t i c u l a r  war i n  a 
p a r t i c u l a r  p l a c e ,  bu t  we have no s u r e f i r e  way t o  
work out  a s t r u c t u r e  t h a t  is good f o r  t h e  e n t i r e  
spectrum of  f u t u r e  wars i n  a l l  t h e  p l a c e s  they  
may O C C U K .  
Consequently,  defense  p lanning  is r i c h  i n  t h e  
kind of a n a l y s i s  t h a t  tel ls  what damage could be 
done t o  t h e  United S t a t e s  g iven  a p a r t i c u l a r  enemy 
f o r c e  s t r u c t u r e ,  but it is poor i n  t h e  kinds of 
a n a l y s e s  t h a t  e v a l u a t e  how we w i l l  a c t u a l l y  s t a n d  
i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  S o v i e t s  i n  years  t o  come. 
We can  des ign  
The V i r t u e s  
I n  view o f  i ts  d e f e c t s ,  is c o s t - e f f e c t i v e n e s s  
r e l i a b l e ?  I f  r e l i a b i l i t y  has  i ts  c o l l o q u i a l  mean- 
ing  of be ing  a measure of whether it works or n o t ,  
t h e  answer is  yes. This is c e r t a i n l y  t h e  opin ion  
of t h e  decirionmakers who have made e x t e n s i v e  u s e  
o f  i t .  A s  Char les  J. H i t c h ,  then  A s s i s t a n t  
S e c r e t a r y  of Defense,  expressed  it: 
In  a way, i t  is q u i t e  i r o n i c  t h a t  t h e  very  
people who a r e  so i n s i s t e n t  t h a t  they  want 
t h c  "best and most modern" i n  Defense 
hardware,  a r e  opposed to t h e  ' b e s t  and 
most modern" i n  Defense ana y s i s  and 
decision-making techniques.  
The f a c t  t h a t  we cannot perform c o s t - e f f e c -  
i 
t i v c n e s s  a n a l y s e s  wi th  anyth ing  near  100 per  c e n t  
conf idence  of  p e r f e c t i o n  is no reason t o  r u l e  O u t  
t h e i r  use.  The r e a l  argument f o r  t h e i r  u s e  is 
t h a t  they  provide  sounder advice  than  the  a l t e r -  
n e t  ivcs .  
These a l t e r n a t i v e s  have d e f e c t s  too. One 
a l t e r n a t i v e  is pure  i n t u i t i o n .  I t  is i n  no s e n s e  
a n a l y t i c ,  s i n c e  no e f f o r t  is made t o  s t r u c t u r e  t h e  
problem or t o  e s t b b l f s h  cause  and e f f e c t  r e l a t i o n -  
s h i p s  and u s e  them to a r r i v e  a t  a s o l u t i o n .  The 
prciccss i s  t o  l e a r n  every th ing  p o s s i b l e  about t h e  
problcm, t o  " l i v e  wi th  i t ,"  and t o  l e t  the  subcon- 
s c i o u s  provide  t h e  s o l u t i o n .  
Between pure  i n t u i t i o n ,  on the  one hand, and  
c o s t - c r f c c t i v e n e s s  a n a l y s i s ,  on the  o t h e r ,  t h e r e  
Lire o t h e r  SOUKCCS of advice  t h a t  c a n ,  i n  a sense .  
I)c cons idercd  t o  employ a n a l y s i s ,  a l though t h e  
a n a l y s i s  i s  o r d i n a r i l y  lcss s y s t e m t i c ,  e x p l i c i t ,  
aiid q u a n t l t a t l v e .  Onc a l t e r n a t i v e  is to  t u r n  to 
an cxpcr t .  H i s  op in ion  c a n ,  i n  f a c t ,  be very  
IicIpTuI,  I f  t t  r c s u l t s  from reasonable  and 
i i i ipartial  cxaminatlon of t h e  f a c t s ,  with due 
u l  Iirwnncc f o r  u n c e r t a i n t y ,  and i f  his amsumptionr 
mid clioln of log ic  a r e  made gxDllci&. For  i f  i t  
i s  v x p l l c i t .  o t h e r s  can  u s e  h l s  InIonnatlon t o  
l i m n  tlic-tr own connldered opinion. 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  an unbiased c x p c r t ,  may be hard t o  
Cind. hnotlicr way of handl ing  a problem is t o  
t u r n  i t  ovcr t o  a cumnittee.  C m i t t e e s ,  however, 
a r e  much lcss l i k e l y  than  e x p e r t s  t o  make t h e i r  
reasoning < , x p l i c i t ,  s i n c e  t h e l r  f i n d i n g s  a r e  
u s u a l  Is d i l a i n e d  by barga in ing .  
wrong a d v i r c ;  i t  may, of c o u r s e ,  b u t  without 
a n a l y s i s  the  chances a r e  much h igher .  And f o r  
yimc qiicst ions a n a l y s i s  i s  e s s e n t i a l :  withou' 
c a l c u l a t i t ~ n  t h e r e  is no way t o  d iscover  how many 
But a n  e x p e r t ,  
Tlic danger is not t h a t  a n a l y s i s  w i l l  g i v e  t h e  
missiles may be  needed t o  d e s t r o y  a t a r g e t  system, 
or how arms c o n t r o l  may a f f e c t  s e c u r i t y .  Analysis 
o f f e r s  a n  a l t e r n a t i v e  t o  'huddl ing  through"; t o  
w a i t i n g  u n t i l  one can  s e e  t h e  problem c l e a r l y  and 
then  a t tempt ing  t o  meet t h e  s i t u a t i o n .  Delay can 
be hazardous; i n  t h e  world today, t h e r e  could be 
a c r i s i s  o r  a weapon t h a t  could not  be handled i n  
t h i s  way. 
such problems can be q u a n t i f i e d  or t h a t  a n a l y s i s  
I s  without l i m i t a t i o n s ,  bu t  on ly  that i t  is not 
s e n s i b l e  t o  formulate p o l i c y  without c a r e f u l  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n  of whatever r e l e v a n t  numbers can be 
discovercd. 
maker u s i n g  a s tudy  team for a d v i c e  and a medical 
doc tor  u s i n g  a c l i n i c a l  l abora tory .  Suppose, f o r  
example, our  doc tor  i s  t r y i n g  t o  decid,! whether 
t o  send h i s  p a t i e n t  t o  a surgeon t o  have h i s  
stomech r e s e c t e d  or t o  t r e a t  him medica l ly  f o r  a 
g a s t r i c  u l c e r .  The doc tor  is in f luenced  by: 
1. The t e c h n i c a l  f i n d i n g s  of the  labora tory  
crews. 
not be a b l e  t o  c a r r y  out  these  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  
h i m s e l f ,  bu t  i t  would not be economic f o r  him t o  
do so. He depends, t h e r e f o r e ,  on l a b o r a t o r y  
r e p o r t s ,  some of which w i l l  be  on co ld  s l i p s  of 
paper without c o m e n t  or nuance--numbers alone. 
Others from the l a b o r a t o r y  might w r i t e  paragraphs 
o r  t a l k  t o  t h e  doc tor  or b r i n g  x-ray p l a t e s  t o  
d i s c u s s  w i t h  him. 
Observations or analyses  t h e  doc tor  makes 
himself.  Some of t h e s e  he  put8 i n  the  form of  
w r i t t e n  n o t e s ;  those  he c a n ' t  write out  h e  re ta ins  
i n  h i s  head. 
3. Impressions of t h e  risks and p o s s i b i l i t i e s  
of success  with var ious  treatments.  Some of these  
impressions a r e  from h i s  exper ience .  o t h e r s  from 
medical r e p o r t s .  
F i n a l l y ,  l i k e  the decisionmaker,  the  doc tor  
m a t  nuke a judgment based on whatever f a c t s  o r  
ana lyses  he  has. This Judgment is the  u l t i m a t e  
s y n t h e s i s  t h e  doc tor  makes of the  numerical t e a t s ,  
t h e  w r i t t e n  out  but r e l a t i v e l y  d i f f u s e d  n o t e s ,  
t h e  unrecorded conversa t ions  with t e c h n i c i a n s ,  
and h i s  own i n t r o s p e c t i o n .  It is not  a mere 
c a l c u l a t i o n ,  but i s  made on i n t u i t i v e  grounds. 
Sometimes a f a c t o r  is o v e r r i d i n g ,  but on the  
whole he J u s t  doesn ' t  know. He could do more 
a n a l y s i s ,  sometimes even r i s k  the p a t i e n t ' s  l i f e  
i n  order  t o  guard i t - - c a l l  for a l i v e r  plincture 
o r  o t h e r  dangerous procedures--but h l s  inqui ry  
can  never be c m p l e t e .  His Judgmcnt. l i k e  t h a t  
of every decisionmaker,  must be made wi th  uncer- 
t a i n t i e s  in mind. 
It is e a s y ,  u n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  t o  exaggerate the  
degree of a s s i s t a n c e  t h a t  a n a l y s i s  can o f f e r  a 
policymaker. In almost every c a s e ,  i t  can he lp  
him understand the re levant  a l t e r n a t i v e s  and the  
key i n t e r a c t i o n s  by provid ing  a n  e s t i m a t e  of the  
c o s t s ,  r i s k s ,  and p o s s i b l e  payoffs a s s o c i a t e d  
wi th  each course  of a c t i o n .  In so doing .  the  
a n a l y s i s  may sharpen 111s i n t u i t i o n ;  i t  w i l l  
c e r t a i n l y  broaden h i s  b a s i s  f o r  judgment. This 
can almost always h e l p  t h e  decisionmaker make a 
b e t t e r  dec is ion  than In: w a i l d  otherwise  make, but 
t h e  inherent  Limitations mean t h a t  a study can 
This  is not t o  say  t h a t  every aspec t  of 
Le t  me draw an analogy between t h e  dec is ion-  
Like the  decisionmaker,  he might or might 
2. 
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se ldon  demonstrate,  beyond a11 reasonable doubt ,  
t n a t  a p a r t i c u l a r  course  of a c t i o n  is b e s t .  
e f f e c t i v e n e s s  a n a l y s i s  is t o  a l a r g e  e x t e n t  a r t ,  
i t  is p o i n t l e s s  t o  expect success t o  follow from 
a set  of d e f i n i t e  r u l e s .  
c o n t r o l  a r e  not a p p l i c a b l e  t o  a n  a r t  and a high 
degree of accuracy i n  an a b i o l u t e  senae i s  mean- 
ing lasa  and impossible. The only  way t o  i n i u r e  
t h a t  the  work is w e l l  done and used wi th  i t a  l i m -  
i t a t i o n s  i n  mind is through a thorough c r i t i q u e  
by o thers .  
completely objec t ive .  The moat we can  hope f o r  
is t h a t  they  be honest in i d e n t i f y i n g  t h e i r  b i a i .  
NOW what about q u a l i t y  c o n t r o l ?  Becauae c o s b  
R e l i a b i l i t y  and q u a l i t y  
For no ind iv idua l  can  hope t o  be 
BLuLULs 
And f i n a l l y ,  what of the f u t u r e ?  Res is tance  
t o  the  use of c o s t - e f f e c t i v e n e s s  a n a l y s i s  t o  h e l p  
in broad problems is gradual ly  breaking down. 
Government and indus t ry  planning have always 
involved more a r t  than s c i e n c e ;  what is happening 
is t h a t  t h e  a r t  form is changing from an adhoc, 
sea t -of - the-pants  approach based on i n t u i t i o n  t o  
one based on a n a l y s i s  $uDDorted by i n t u i t i o n  and 
experience.  W i t h  t h i s  change the  computer is 
becoming increas ingly  s i g n i f i c a n t - - a s  an a u t m a -  
t o n ,  a process c o n t r o l l e r .  an information proces- 
s o r ,  and a decis ion  u. I t s  usefu lness  i n  
serv ing  t h e s e  ends can be expected t o  grow. But 
a t  the  same t ime,  i t  is important t o  note tha t  
even the b e s t  computer is no more than a too l  t o  
expedi te  a n a l y s i s .  
dec is ions  can  be made today s o l e l y  by cons ider -  
a t i o n  of computer c a l c u l a t i o n s  a r e  not  on ly  pre- 
mature i n  t h e i r  b e l i e f  ( t o  say the  l e a s t ) ,  but 
have a baaic misunderstanding of how such ca lcu-  
l a t i o n s  must. in f a c t .  always be used. Even i n  
t h e  narrowest d e c i s i o n s ,  rona idera t lons  not 
s u b j e c t  t o  any s o r t  of q u a n t i t a t i v e  a n a l y s i s  can 
always be present .  Big d e c i s i o n s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  
cannot be t h e  a u t o n u t i c  consequence o f  a computer 
program, of c o s t - e f f e c t i v e n e s s  a n a l y s i s ,  or any 
a p p l i c a t i o n  of mathematical models. 
For broad s t u d i e s .  involving f o r c e  pos ture  
and composition o r  the s t r a t e g y  t o  achieve  forc ign  
p o l i c y  o b j e c t i v e s ,  i n t u i t i v e ,  s u b J e c t i v e ,  even 
but supplcmented t o  an increas ing  ex ten t  by c o s t -  
c f f c c t i v e n c s s  a n a l y s i s .  And a9 ingredien ts  of 
t h i s  a n a l y s i s ,  along with an incrcas ing  usc of  the  
computer f o r  those problems where i t  i s  appropr l -  
a t e ,  i n  recogni t ion  of thc  necd f o r  a b c t t c r  
treatment of  the nonquant i f lab ie  a s p e c t s ,  a Rrcs tc r  
usc of techniques f o r  t h e  b c t t c r  cniploymcnt of 
judgment, i n t u i t i o n ,  and expericncc can bc cxpcct-  
cd. These technlqucs: war gaming. "accnarlo" 
w r i t i n g .  and thc sys temat ic  Lnterrogation .if 
e x p e r t s  a r e  on tlic way t o  bccuming an in temrs l  
p a r t  of con t -ef fee t iveness ana lya is. 
Morcover, t h e  rcope w i I I  broadcn. Coat- 
e f f a c t i v e n c i i  has b a r e l y  en tercd  the domain of tlio 
a o c i a l  ac ienccs ,  where i n  urban p lanning ,  in 
educa t ion ,  i n  w e l f a r e ,  and i n  o t h e r  nonmi l i ta ry  
aspec ta  of government wc a r e  faccd with an abun- 
dance of  cha l lenges :  how t o  a l l e v i a t e  the hard- 
ahlpa of  s o c i a l  change, how t o  provldc food and 
comfort f o r  t h e  poor ,  how to  improve the a o c i a l  
i n a t i t u t i o n a  and the  v a l u e i  of the  a f f l u e n t ,  how 
Those advocates who hold t h a t  
study scherncs must continue t o  bc used-- 
to  cope wi th  revolu t ionary  innovat ions ,  and so on. 
Cos t -e f fec t iveness  ana lys i s2  can he lp  with tlicse 
problems as wel l  as those of i n d u s t r y  and t h e  
m i l i t a r y .  
Cone ludinn Remarks 
And now t o  rcview. A cost-cffcctivcn.,ss 
a n a l y s i s  is an a n a l y t i c  study designed t o  as. : ist  
a d e c i s i o m a k e r  i d e n t i f y  a prefer red  choice  from 
among p o s s i b l e  a l t e r n a t i v e s .  I t  is c h a r a c t e r i z e d  
by a wystemrtic and r a t i o n a l  approach, w i t h  
assumptions made e x p l i c i t ,  o b j c c t  Lves and c r i t e r i a  
c l e a r l y  d e f i n e d ,  and a l t e r r u t i v c  courses  of a c t i o n  
compared in t h e  l i g h t  of t h c i r  p o s s i b l c  cimsc- 
quences. An e f f o r t  is made t o  usc  q u a n t i t a t i v r  
methods but computers a r c  not c s u c n t i a l .  Wlidt I s  
e s s e n t i a l  is a model t h a t  cnablcs q w r t  i n t u i t i o n  
and Judgment t o  he appi lcd  c f f l c i s n t l y .  Tlic 
method provldcs  i t s  uiiswcrs by proccsscs  t h a t  a r c  
a c c c s s i b l c  t o  c r i t i c a l  cxamination. capalilv o f  
d u p l i c a t i o n  by o t l ic rs .  and ,  morc ur l r s s .  rrmilily 
modified as ncw information bcconies ava i lah lc* .  
And, i n  c o n t r a s t  t i l  o t h c r  aids t o  dccisiuruiinking. 
which shore  thc uamc l i m i t a t i o n s ,  i t  e x t r a c t s  
every th ing  p o s s i b l r  from s c i e n t i f i c  methods, and 
i t s  v i r t u c s  a r c  t h e  v i r t u e s  of  thosc mcthods. At 
i t s  narrowest, c o s t - e f i c c t l v c n c s s  a n a l y s i s  ai l fk .rs  
a way t o  clioosc t h e  numerical q u a n t i t i e s  r c i n t c d  
t o  a weapon system so t h a t  thcy arc l o g i c a l l y  
c o n s i s t e n t  with cacli o t h c r ,  w i t h  an assunicd obJcc-  
t i v e ,  and with t h c  c a l c u l a t o r ' s  cxpcctatl6,ii of tlic 
f u t u r e .  A t  i t s  b r o a d e s t ,  i t  can he lp  guide 
n a t i o n a l  po l icy .  But ,  cvcn wi th in  the Dupartnivnt 
of Defense ,  i t 8  c a p e b i l l t i c s  have a s  yet 1,) hc 
f u  11 y exp Lotted . 
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